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THE "CASH SALE" PRESUMPTION IN BAD CHECK CASES:
DOCTRINAL AND POLICY ANOMALY
SEF.ERS who accept worthless checks frequently seek to avoid the loss by
recovering from third parties to whom the buyer has transferred the goods.
Recovery depends on who is found to hold title to the merchandise.1 While
the intent of the parties governs title passage,2 sellers and buyers rarely ex-
press any clear intention. 3 So courts are forced to presume the parties' intent.
The presumptions of intent contained in Section 19 of the Uniform Sales
Act provide for title passage irrespective of payment. Yet numerous courts
presume that a non-credit transaction r (goods to be paid for on delivery)
1. Under the Uniform Sales Act, upon unconditional delivery, seller loses his lien, § 56,
his right to resell, § 60, and his power to rescind title passage, §§ 61, 65. Thus, unless
seller retains a security interest, only "title" will permit him to recover the gcods.
The common law and statutory technique of resolving nearly every question in saIs
law by resort to "tidle" has been severely criticized. See Llewellyn, Through Tite to
Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rtv. 159, 165 (193S). The Uniform Cjm-
mercial Code (Official Draft 1952) seeks to eliminate the pre-eminent impc~rtance of the
title concept. See Latty, Sales and Title in the Proposed Code, 16 L.w & Co6nz'wi.
PRo B. 3 (1951). For a criticism of the Code's position and a defense of the title concept,
see Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Un:iform Commercial Cede, 03 HARv. L.
REv. 561, 568 (1950).
2. UNrFos SALEs Acr § 18. The Act has been adopted by 35 states, Hawaii, and
the District of Columbia. For cases in these and common law jurisdictions, see I Urn-
FOR.m LAWs AqNOTAT , Su.y.s § 18. See also Wmusroi, TE L W Go,-rnrn.;G SALES
OF GooDs § 261 (2d ed. 1948) (hereinafter cited as Wimis oi, Su .Es); VOLD, H,%,;D-
EooR oF n LAW OF SALES 122 (1931) (hereinafter cited as VoLD, SALEs).
3. This is particularly true in cases where the seller does not agree to deliver go ids
until he receives payment. He considers possession of the goods all the security he nce&1,
so there is generally no reason to provide specifically for title passage. See Note, 23
Ky. L.J. 322, 325 (1940).
4. UNiFoR.- S uxs Acr § 19. These presumptions, of course, do not necessarily reflect
the parties' ("true") intention. See Latty, Sales and Title in the Proposed Code, 10 Lw
& Coxxp. PRoB. 3, 12, 13 (1951). It has long been recognized that courts use pre-
sumptions of title passage to achieve what they consider to be sound commercial results.
E.g., HoLswo=, A HIsToRy OF THE EN-GLisH LAw 355 (3d ed. 1927). See also Note,
4 ST. Jon's L. Rrv. 85, 86 (1929).
5. For a "cash sale" (see note 6 inf ra), absence of credit is essential. E.g., Weyerhaeuser
Timber Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 150 Ore. 172, 43 P.2d 1073 (1935); Gustafson v. Equitable
Loan Ass'n, 136 'Minn. 236, 243 N.W. 106 (1932); John Sims & Sons v. Bolton, 133
Ga. 73, 74 S.E. 770 (1912). Whether a check alters the original non-credit character of the
transaction is, therefore, a crucial question. See notes 50 and 54 infra. A "cash sale" has
occasionally been found where the buyer failed to surrender a note, e.g., Millhiser v. Erd-
man, 93 N.C. 292, 3 S.E. 521 (187); Coggill v. Hartford & N.H.R.RL, 3 Gray 545
(Mfass. 1854), although in such cases credit has obviously been e.'tendcd. See VoId,
Cash Sales, 14 ST. LoTns L. REv. 1, 9 n.27 (1928). Whether the transaction is for credit
depends on the parties' intention. And in the absence of express intention, courts generally
presume the sale to be a non-credit transaction. E.g., Gustafson v. Equitable Loan Ass'n,
supra.
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indicates that the parties intended a "cash sale"O-payment to be a condition
of title passage.7 No title passes to the buyer if he gives a worthless check
to the seller, since a check is generally not deemed payment until honored.8
And under the axiom that one cannot pass better title than he himself holds,
the buyer cannot transfer title to a third party. Some courts still permit seller
recovery on this rationale 10 despite the trend in modern bad check cases
toward protection of bona fide third parties.1
On a conceptual level, the "cash sale" presumption defies justification.
Under the Uniform Sales Act, a non-credit transaction by itself cannot raise
a presumption of "cash sale." Section 42 of the Act presumes that, unless
otherwise agreed, delivery of the goods and payment of the price are concur-
rent conditions. If an agreement, express or presumed, for payment on de-
livery is used as a basis for finding that the parties intended title to pass on
payment, then Section 42 must necessarily lead to the same result. But
such an interpretation of the Act is absurd: Section 19 presumes that the
parties intended title to pass irrespective of payment at the same time Section
42 would presume that the parties intended title to pass upon payment. 12
The only reasonable interpretation of the two sections is that "payment on
6. "Cash sale" can be defined in three ways. (1) Payment, title passage, and delivery
coincide. This is the definition used in this Note. See LLEWLLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON SALES 703 (1930); WILLISTON, SALES § 341 et seq.; Vold, Cash Sales, 14 ST. Louis
L. REv. 1 (1928); Note, 4 ST. JOHN'S L. Ray. 85 (1929). But see TIFrANY, SALES 123,
268 (2d ed. 1908). (2) Payment is a condition of delivery only. (3) Payment is merely
a condition of title passage. For the alternative definitions, see Notes, 28 Ky. L.J. 322
(1940) ; 36 Dick. L. Rev. 276, 277 (1932).
7. E.g., Publicker Commercial Alcohol Co. v. Harger, 129 Conn. 655, 31 A-2d 27
(1943); De Vries v. Sig Ellingson & Co., 100 F. Supp. 781 (D. Minn. 1951); Tyler v.
Kelley Timber Products Co., 192 Ore. 368, 233 P.2d 774 (1951) ; Parker v. First Citizens
Bank & Trust Co., 299 N.C. 527, 50 S.E.2d 304 (1948). For a collection of cases, see
WILLIST N, SALES § 346a n.14; Notes, 20 CHI. KENT. L. REv. 182, 183 n.3 (1942) ; 28 Ky.
L.J. 322, 323 n.11 (1940).
8. For cases, see ST=-rN, CASES ON COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT PAPER 116
(1939). This rule has been adopted in § 2-511(3) of the proposed Uniform Commercial
Code (Official Draft 1952).
9. UN F Rm SALES AcT § 23(1). See also UNrFORm CoMMERCIAL CODE § 2-403(1)
(Official Draft 1952). The axiom, traditional trap for bona fide third parties, fits into
the pattern of a "caveat emptor" law of sales. See, generally, Hamilton, The Ancient
Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931).
10. See note 7 supra.
11. For the modern case law trend, see Notes, 13 Mo. L. REv. 211, 213 (1948) ; 20
CHI. KENT. L. REv. 182, 187 (1942). See also cases cited in notes 39, 48, 49, 55 in! ra.
12. Yet a presumption for a "cash sale," because payment and delivery are simultaneous,
leads to this conclusion. Tyler v. Kelley Timber Products Co., 192 Ore. 368, 233 P.2d
774 (1951), involved a contract for the delivery of logs, payment to be made by cheek
every two weeks. When the check for the last installment was dishonored, the seller
brought an action for replevin against the assignee of the buyer's mortgagee. The court
held that in the absence of an express agreement, § 42 provides for a "cash sale." Brushing
off the two week period, the court found delivery and payment "substantially simultaneous."
See note 50 infra. The seller was found to hold title and permitted to recover. In Turner
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delivery"--whether expressly agreed to or presumed-refers only to the time
when the goods are to be transferred physically, while title passes under Section
19 regardless of payment.13 Nor can Section 19 be rebutted by contract clauses
using the word "cash"--such as "Cash on Delivery" or "For Cash."'-' Such
clauses in commercial parlance have the same meaning as "Payment on De-
livery.'
5
Mloreover, courts presuming a "cash sale" often ignore facts which seem to
support the Section 19 presumptions. Section 19 presumes, for e.xample,
that when specific goods are sold, the parties intend title to pass before
delivery or payment.10 How can one reasonably infer that the parties do not
intend to pass title when the seller, immediately after contracting, delivers the
goods and receives conditional payment in the form of a check? Yet a
contract which contemplates immediate execution is often considered an ear-
mark of a "cash sale." 17 Certainly, an "intent" to transfer ownership seems
far more likely when the seller delivers the goods and accepts a check than
where there has been no delivery and no attempt to make payment. Furthermore,
a "cash sale" presumption appears wholly unrealistic when a merchant is the
buyer.' s Sellers who, in the ordinary course of business, transfer goods to
a merchant, without any limit on his right to resell, must expect the buyer
to sell as soon as a customer is found. Translated into doctrinal terms, the
seller "intends" to transfer at least one element of title, the right to resell;19
thus the buyer would receive actual authority to dispose of the goods. -3
v. Benz Bros. & Co., 153 Wash. 123, 279 Pac. 398 (1929), the court applied § 19. But
then referring to § 42, the court concluded that in the absence of an agreement to the con-
trary, no title passed to the buyer before payment The seller recovered.
13. See \WVIumsox, SALEs § 448; Void, Cash Sales, 14 ST. Louis L. Rmr. 1 (1923).
14. E.g., Goddard Grocer Co. v. Freedman, 127 S.W.2d 759 (Mo. 1939) ("cash
price") ; Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. First National Bank, 150 Ore. 172, 43 P.2d 107S
(1935) (terms 98% cash); Cass County Bank v. Hulen, 195 S.W. 74 (M1o. 1917) ("cash
on delivery"). See also Notes, 24 GEO. L.J. 172 (1935) ; 17 Tmai. L. rEv. 272,273 (1942).
15. South San Francisco Pacdng & Provision Co. v. Jacobsen, 183 Cal. 131, 190 Pac.
628 (1920) ; Kinney v. Horwitz, 93 Conn. 211, 105 At. 438 (1919) ; Gillingham v. Phelps,
5 Wash. 2d 410, 105 P.2d 825 (1940). See also WILLISTo., SA.LEs § 343; Note, 4 ST.
JoiN"s L. Rnv. 85 (1929).
16. § 19, Rule 1.
17. E.g., WmLisrox, SALES § 343; Void, Cash Sales, 14 ST. Louis L. Rnv. 1, 3
(1928).
18. E.g., Peerless Motor Co. v. Sterling Finance Corp., 139 Cal. App. 621, 34 P.2d 733
(1934); Boyd v. Bank of Mercer Co., 174 Mo. App. 431, 160 S.W. 5S7 (1913); Keegan
v. Lenzie, 171 Ore. 194, 135 P.2d 717 (1943) ; John S. Hale & Co. v. Beley Cotton Co.,
154 Tenn. 6S9, 290 S.W. 944 (1927).
19. "If the principal sends his commodity to a place, where it is the ordinary business
of the person to whom it is confided to sell, it must be inteded that the commodity was
sent thither for the purpose of sale." Lord Ellenborough in Pickering v. Bukl, 15 East 33,
43 (1812) (emphasis added). For a criticism of the decision, see WUVusi'o:x, SA.Es
§ 314.
20. See Vold, Cash Sales, 14 ST. Louis L REv. 1, 9 (1928). Ci. Kearby . Western
States Securities Co., 31 Ariz. 104, 250 Pac. 766 (1926).
1952]
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The weakness of the "cash sale" doctrine is most obvious in the way
courts manipulate presumptions of the parties' intent 21 according to the
nature of the claim. For example, in actions for the price, courts generally
hold that title passes according to the Section 19 presumptions 22 However,
when the seller who accepted a bad check sues a third party to recover goods,
courts ignore Section 19 and presume that the parties intended title to pass
at the time of payment, 23 despite a contract nearly identical with those in
successful price actions. 24 In short, seller recovers in the price action
21. For various imaginative speculations about the "true" intentions of the parties,
see, e.g., WILLisToN, SATES § 346a; Collins, Title to Goods Paid For with Worthless
Check, 15 So. CAL. L. REv. 340, 342 (1942) ; Notes, 13 Mo. L. REv. 211, 212 (1948) ; 34
IOWA L. REv. 37.1, 372 (1949) ; 13 ORE. L. REv. 177, 178 (1934).
22. See cases cited in 1A UNiFORm LAWS ANNoTAED, SAmS § 63 n.32. See also note
24 infra.
23. See cases cited notes 7 supra and 24 infra.
24. E.g., ALABAMA: Compare Barksdale v. Banks, 206 Ala. 569, 90 So. 913 (1921)
(sale of mules; express clause for payment by cash; payment made by bad check; seller
recovers mules from bona fide purchaser), with Iron City Grain Co. v. Arnold, 215 Ala.
543, 112 So. 123 (1927) (hay sold by the ton, immediate delivery and payment contem-
plated by parties; hay delivered and price ascertained but hay destroyed by fire before
payment; seller recovers price); CALIFORNrA: Compare South San Francisco Packing
& Provision Co. v. Jacobsen, 183 Cal. 131, 190 Pac. 628 (1920) (sale of hogs, payment
to be made by check upon delivery; goods delivered and buyer's check dishonored; seller
recovers hogs from buyer's creditors), with Browning v. McNear, 158 Cal. 525, 111 Pac.
541 (1910) (sale of grain, to be paid for when shipped; goods destroyed before payment;
seller recovers price); CONNEcrIcur: Compare Publicker Commerical Alcohol Co. v.
Harger, 129 Conn. 655, 31 A.2d 27 (1943) (sale of alcohol in installmentS, payment to be
made by checks which buyer had signed and left with seller; checks to be filled out at each
delivery; check dishonored after delivery of installment; seller recovers alcohol from bona
fide third parties), with Kinney v. Horwitz, 93 Conn. 211, 105 Atl. 438 (1919) (sale of
potatoes, payment to be made when bill of lading delivered; bill drawn in name of seller
and not delivered to buyer; potatoes destroyed by fire; seller recovers price) ; MINNESOTA :
Compare Gustafson v. Equitable Loan Ass'n, 186 Minn. 236, 243 N.W. 106 (1932) (goods
delivered for check; check dishonored; seller recovers goods from third party), Tilh Mobile
Fruit & Trading Co. v. McGuire, 81 Minn. 232, 83 N.W. 833 (1900) (sale of bananas, pay-
ment presumably to be made -n delivery; goods deteriorated before delivery; seller recovers
price); Missouxi: Compare Lewis v. James McMahon & Co., 307 Mo. 552, 271 S.W.
779 (1925) (sale of oil, check payment when bill of lading delivered; check dishonored;
seller held to have retained title and third party not bona fide so oil recovhred), with
Williams v. Evans' Adm'r, 39 Mo. 201 (1866) (sale of goods with payment to be made
on delivery; buyer held to have received title and thus risk of loss on him) ; NEW Jursvmy:
Compare Morehouse v. Keyport Auto Sales Co., 118 N.J. Eq. 368, 179 AtI. 279 (1935)
(sale of car, payment by check on delivery; check dishonored; seller permitted to
recover car from buyer's creditors because parties intended title to pass on payment),
with Lummis v. Millville Mfg. Co., 72 N.J.L. 25, 60 A.2d 19 (1905) (sale of grain, pay-
ment to be made against delivery; seller received check, but buyer stopped payment when
schooner carrying grain sank; held seller recovers price because title had passed to
buyer); OHaIO: Compare Rehr v. Trumbull Lumber Co., 110 Ohio St. Rep. 208, 143 N.E.
558 (1924) (timber sold f.o.b., payment to be made on delivery, part in cash, part by
note; seller recovers goods from buyer's receiver), with Newhall v. Langdon, 39 Ohio
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because title passed to the buyer while he wins his action to recover goods
because the court finds he has retained title--contradictory theories. The
paradox can be explained only by the policies courts are seeking to imple-
ment. Historically, courts have followed a policy of shifting the risk of
destruction of goods to the buyer as soon as possible.s Since this risk of
loss follows title,203 early title passage must be found in price actions. Apparently,
courts have also sought to protect sellers against losses from non-payment;
so courts are inclined to find title in the unpaid seller when he sues to recover
goods. To accomplish both policies, the doctrinal inconsistency vms inevi-
table.2 7 But seller recovery of goods from bona fide third parties is no
longer supported by sound commercial policy.
Some courts and commentators have suggested that the "cash sale" doctrine
safeguards transferability of goods;2 if recovery from third parties were
denied, sellers would be reluctant to exchange goods for checks and require,
instead, the more burdensome cash payment.2 An equally speculative argu-
ment, however, could justify rejection of the "cash sale" presumption.O
Third party liability might delay sales until prospective purchasers could
ascertain the details of prior transactions. Purchaser caution should impede
transferability as much as seller reluctance to accept checks. Moreover, the
threat of bad check losses should not necessarily outweigh the seller's interest
in the speed and convenience of check transactions.3 '
Relatively simple precautions would enable sellers to prevent bad check
losses in most cases. Sellers can call or wire the buyer's bank to learn whether
sufficient funds are on deposit.3 2 Such practices would have revealed the
St. Rep. 87, 48 Am. Rep. 426 (1383) (sale of flour, payment to be made on delivery; flour
destroyed before delivery or payment; seller recovers price); NVAsu;n ro: Con~pare
Quality Shingle Co. v. Old Oregon Lumber & Shingle Co., 110 Wash. 60, 187 Pac. 705 (1920)
(sale of ascertained shingles, check payment to be made on delivery of bill of lading;
check dishonored; bill of lading held non-negotiable; seller recovers proceeds frum sale
of goods from third party), with Izett v. Stetson & Post Mill Co., 22 Wash. 300, 60
Pac. 1123 (1900) (logs sold with payment deferred until scaling; .vithout scaling or
payment, logs delivered to buyer; seller recovers price).
25. See Gilmore, Chattel Security, 57 YAtn L.J. 517, 523 (1948).
26. UTnropt S.kEs Act § 22. The same rule existed under common law. Vu.-
LISTON, SALE-s § 301.
27. For a criticism of "title" as the solution of nearly all problems in the law of sales,
see sources cited note 1 supra.
28. See Young v. Harris-Cortner Co., 152 Tenn. 15,268 S.W. 125 (1924). For a discus-
sion of this argument, see VoLD, SALEs 175, 176; Void, Worthless Check Cash Sales,
"Substantially Simultaneous" and Conflicti2n Analogies, 1 HAsTiGs JoutNIAL 111, 127 n.42;
Ballantine, Purchase for Value and Estoppel, 6 Mm:,. L. RIv. 86, 120 et seq. (1922);
Note, 28 Ky. L.J. 322, 326 (1940).
29. See Young v. Harris-Cortner Co., 152 Tenn. 15, 25, 2683 SAV. 125, 127 (1924).
30. See Cowan v. Thompson, 25 Tenn. App. 130, 152 S.V.2d 1036 (1941); Note,
28 Ky. L J. 322, 326 (1940).
31. Ibid.
32. Banks generally disclose to anyone whether a check for a specified amount would
be covered by the account. On the other hand, they do not give information relating to
19521
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worthlessness of buyer's check in almost all the reported cases.88 While
speedy communication devices were unavailable when common law courts
developed the "cash sale" doctrine, today such inquiries are feasible. But a
call or wire does not preclude all risks: the buyer's signature may be
forged 34 or the funds may be withdrawn or exhausted after the seller's
inquiry.3 5 These risks, however, may be minimized. The seller can withhold
delivery until the check is cleared. Or certification, though admittedly im-
practical for most transactions, may be demanded when valuable goods are
sold. Finally, the seller can always refuse to accept the buyer's check if he
has cause to be suspicious.36
On the other hand, a third party can prevent the loss only by tracing
title every time he intends to acquire goods. To succeed, the third party
would have to determine whether: the prior parties intended payment to be
a condition of title passage; payment in any preceding transaction had been
made by check; the check had been honored or the seller had been paid
another way. Clearly, it would be completely impractical to require such
diligence of prospective third parties. And judicial standards of good faith
have never demanded these efforts unless special facts forewarned the third
party.3 7
the amount on deposit unless the other party has identified himself as the the owner or
shows some other authorization. See COUNTRY BANKS OPERATION COMM., AMERcAN
BANKERS Ass'N, BANK TELLERS DO'S AND DON'T'S 2 (March 1952). Under these circum-
stances the seller could obtain sufficient information before he surrenders possession of tile
goods in the great majority of the check transactions. He can, of course, always discover
whether the other party has an account with the named bank.
33. In 119 of 126 bad check cases examined, the reported facts show no inquiry by
the seller. Yet in almost the same number of cases the facts suggest that no account
existed or insufficient funds were on deposit when the seller accepted the check.
34. See, e.g., Dudley v. Lovins, 310 Ky. 491, 220 S.W.2d 978 (1949). In forgery
cases, the potential buyer is probably a stranger. Sellers should always exercise greater
care when dealing with strangers. And if the buyer presents a check in the name of a firm,
the seller should ascertain from the firm the buyer's authority. Where the buyer passes a
check with a forged certification, the seller's inquiry at the bank would disclose the
fraud. See Goddard Grocer Co. v. Freedman, 127 S.W.2d 759 (Mo. 1939).
35. No case has been found where the buyer withdrew his funds after delivery of the
check in order to defraud the seller. There are cases, however, where the buyer's account
would have covered the check sometime between its surrender and its presentation. E..,,
South San Francisco Packing& Provision Co. v. Jacobsen, 183 Cal. 131, 190 Pac. 628 (1920) ;
Crescent Chevrolet Co. v. Lewis, 230 Iowa 1074, 300 N.W. 260 (1941). No fraud was
found in either case.
36. Sellers are generally not obliged to accept a check instead of cash payment. E..,,
Karetnick v. Skriloff, 8 N.J. Misc. 671, 151 Atl. 386 (1930). But cf. Lee v. Hendrickson,
303 Ky. 39, 196 S.W2d 880 (1946) (certified check held valid tender of payment).
Under the proposed Uniform Commercial Code, the seller, although under no obligation
to accept anything but legal tender, is required to extend reasonably the period of pay-
ment if he rejects tender which is made "by any means or in any manner current in the
ordinary course of business." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-511 (2) (Official Draft
1952).
37. E.g., Goddard Grocer Co. v. Freedman, 127 S.W.2d 759 (Mo. 1939).
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A rule holding sellers liable would probably distribute bad check losses
more equitably. If seller and third party are both merchants or both con-
sumers, one cannot generalize that either is likely to be a better risk bearer.OF
If merchants, both may be able to include the loss in the cost of business
operations; if consumers, neither can do so. Since merchants constantly
alternate between seller and purchaser roles, they would not benefit or suffer
from either seller or third party liability for bad check losses. But consumers
are typically ultimate purchasers, seldom sellers. In almost every bad check
case involving a consumer, therefore, he will be the third party and the "ca'4h
sale" doctrine would shift the loss to him, the party probably less able to bear
it. In sum, seller liability for worthless checks would place the loss on the
party, who is both better able to prevent it and more often the better risk
bearer.
To further third party protection, courts should adhere to the Section 19
presumptions of title passage.39 Only a clearly expressed intent to the cun-
trary, not a "Cash on Delivery" clause, should rebut Section 19:0 In juris-
dictions that adopt the proposed Uniform Commercial Code, all purcha.ers
in the ordinary course of business will be protected regardless of title
notions.4 1 For other third parties, however, title remains significant. '- The
Code requires an explicit agreement to pass title at the time of payment 3
and expressly says a "Cash Sale" clause, by itself, would not qualify.4 1 Ewn
strict adherence to Section 19 or the proposed Code would permit sellers and
buyers to contract for title passage upon payment. 45 So sellers may continue
38. But see Note, 28 KY. L.J. 322, 326 (1940), where it is suggested that the seller
should bear the loss in bad check cases because he profits from the increased turnover of
goods.
39. Section 19 of the Uniform Sales Act was designed to c-dify the con-aut a Ia= of
title passage. Wn.usox, SALEs § 264. It could be argued that since the c.,ntradictory
presumptions of title passage, see note 24 supra, were applied bMfore adopticn oi the Act,
§ 19 was not intended to alter the presumptions used in unpaid sellers' actions to recover
goods. However, as a matter of statutory interpretation, § 19 on its face wvould cover
the typical "cash sale" case.
If title is held to have passed under § 19, the seller could still recover the ge:ds from
the buyer if the check was fraudulently offered as payment since the buyer's title vwould
be "voidable." Cf. Island Trading Co. v. Berg Bros., Inc., 239 N.Y. 229, 146 N.E.
345 (1924) ; Petty v. Borg, 106 Utah 524, 150 P.2d 776 (1944). Or the seller may be
found to have reserved his right of possession as against the buyer. U: .L SVxts ACT
§ 20. However, a voidable title would become indefeasible if transferred to a bona fide buyer.
Id. § 24. E.g., Dudley v. Lovins, 310 Ky. 491, 220 S.W2d 978 (1949); Parr v. Huifrich,
108 Neb. 801, 189 NV. 281 (1922); Ross v. Leuci, 85 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1949). Ci.
Crescent Chevrolet Co. v. Lewis, 230 Iowa 1074, 300 N.W. 260 (1941).
40. Seee Note, 36 Dick. L REv. 276, 232 (1932).
41. UNiFoom CotmXcLt L Comy § 2-403 (Official Draft 1952).
42. Id. § 2-401.
43. Id. § 2-401 (1).
44. Id. §2-401 (1)(b).
45. Courts could not reasonably avoid finding a cash sale if the seller expresses
an intent not to transfer title when he receives the check. E.g., Turner v. Benz Bros. & Co.,
19521
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to use the "cash sale" rationale to seek recovery from some third parties.
Other doctrines would be needed to block such attempts.
Some writers -have urged that the seller who surrenders goods in exchange
for a check should be presumed to have waived his right to retain title.40 The
presumption of waiver, however, makes little sense if a court initially finds a
"cash sale." At the very time a court determines that the parties intended no
title passage, the court is asked to presume seller's waiver of title retention.47
While the waiver defense has rarely been applied,48 a few courts have pro-
tected third parties on a conditional sale or chattel mortgage rationale :4
the "cash sale" seller, like the conditional seller, is extending credit 60
153 Wash. 123, 279 Pac. 398 (1929) ("the hay is mine until it is paid for"). Or where
the seller purposely does not transfer a bill of sale to the buyer. E.g., Alonso v. Badger,
58 Cal. App. 2d 752, 138 P.2d 24 (1943). Car sellers frequently retain the certificate of
title to ensure payment of the check. E.g., Kirk v. Madsen, 240 Iowa 532, 36 N.W.2d
757 (1949).
46. This approach has been suggested by WILLsToN, SAI.ss §§ 346a, 346b, and has
been adopted by Collins, Title to Goods Paid For by Worthless Cheek, 15 So. CALIP. L.
REv. 340 (1942), and in Note, 28 Ky. L.J. 322 (1940). See also Comment, 34 IowA L. Rsv.
371 (1948).
47. For a criticism of the waiver approach, see Vold, Worthless Check Cash Sales,
"Substantially Simultaneous" and Conflicting Analogies, 1 HASTINGS JOURNAL 111, 114,
115 (1950).
48. Veblen v. Foss, 32 Wash. 2d 385, 201 P.2d 719 (1949). Cf. United States v. Lutz,
142 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1944) ; Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. First National Bank, 150 Ore.
172, 43 P.2d 1078 (1935).
49. Georgia is the only jurisdiction in which a conditional sale statute seems to be
regularly applied in bad check cases. E.g., Hall v. Le Croy, 79 Ga. App. 676, 54 S.E.2d 468
(1949) ; Capital Automobile Co. v. Ward, 54 Ga. App. 873, 189 S.E. 713 (1936) ; Brumby
Chair Co. v. City of Columbus, 46 Ga. App. 163, 167 S.E. 221 (1932). The chattel
mortgage approach has recently been used in Pettus v. Powers, 185 S.W.2d 872 (Kan,
1945). An attempt to introduce the rationale in Iowa was apparently unsuccessful.
Compare Morse v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 73 Iowa 226, 34 N.W. 825 (1887), with
Crescent Chevrolet Co. v. Lewis, 230 Iowa 1074, 300 N.W. 260 (1941). Some courts and
commentators have rejected the recording approach. Morehouse v. Keyport Auto Sales
Co., 118 N.J. Eq. 368, 179 Atl. 279 (1935); Johnson Brinkman Comm. Co. v. Central
Bank, 116 Mo. 558, 22 S.W. 813 (1893). See also Comment, 13 Mo. L. REv. 211, 216
(1948). The crux of the dispute is whether or not the seller can be considered to have
extended credit. See notes 50, 54 infra. For a general discussion of the conditional sale
rationale, see Vold, Cash Sales, 14 ST. Louis L. REy. 1, 9 (1928); Comment, 34 IowA L.
Rv. 371 (1948) ; Note, 28 Ky. L.J. 322, 327 (1940).
50. The argument is that although the parties did not contemplate a credit transaction,
the seller actually extended credit. See cases cited in note 49 supra. See also Note, 28
Ky. L.J. 322, 325 (1940). Of course, some time will always elapse between exchange of
goods for a check and payment of the check by the bank. Proponents of the "cash sale"
doctrine have met this difficulty by qualifying the non-credit requirement. Transfer of
goods and payment must only be "substantially simultaneous." For discussion and cases,
see VoId, Worthless Check Cash Sales, "Substantially Simultaneous" and Cotflicthig
Analogies, 1 HASTINGS JOURNAL 111 (1951); Collins, Title to Goods Paid For with
Worthless Check, 15 So. CALIF. L. REv. 340, 343 n.22 (1942) ; Note, 28 Ky. L.J. 322 11.3
(1940). Nevertheless, delivery and ultimate payment are not "actually" simultaneous, and
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and retains title to secure payment ;51 and unless the "cash sale' seller pub-
licizes the transaction, he deserves no greater protection than the conditional
seller who fails to record his rightsr 2 While this rationale would protect
bona fide third parties z3 in the face of a clear intent to retain title, applica-
tion of the recording statutes is unrealistic. Acceptance of a check does not
create the type of credit transaction contemplated by the recording statutes.54
Hence, a seller in the ordinary check transaction will never use a record-
ing device. The conditional sale rationale thus seems like an unduly com-
plicated way of avoiding the "cash sale" doctrine.
Estoppel is the most common defense.t Following a traditional common law
rule, courts generally hold the seller estopped if he is guilty of laches in pre-
the seller who accepts a check, in effect, relies on the buyer's creditworthiness. Note,
38 YALE L.J. 1154, 1155 (1929). Whether this can be called an extension of credit, there-
fore, is primarily a question of terminology. See note 54 infra.
51. See Comment, 34 IowA L. RE%. 371, 373 (194S).
52. For use of this analogy to support the estoppel doctrine see note 62 infra.
53. The parties who are considered to be worth protecting under, e.g., a c .nditional
sale statute, do not necessarily coincide with those whose protection in non-crccdt tra.uac-
tions seems desirable. Conditional sales statutes generally protect only purchasers for value
and lien creditors. UNTIoaam COxDITIONAL SALES Act § 5. Other third parties, such as
brokers, would not be covered by such provisions and therefore be fborced to bear the bad chckT
loss. See De Vries v. Sig Ellingson & Co., 100 F. Supp. 781 (D. Mii. 1951). 'Mor ver,
while some states have promoted conditional sales and other chattel security devices by
protecting sellers without recording, WnLIsToNT, SAL.s, Appendix C, Note to § 5, similar
protection for sellers who accept worthless checks is not necessarily sound.
54. The common denominator of both transactions is, of course, that title passage is
conditioned on payment See Note, 9 CALIF. L. R v. 78 (1921). And huw the parties label
the transaction is irrelevant See, e.g.. N.Y. World Telegram Corp. v. McGoldrick, 23
N.Y. 11, 80 N.E.2d 61 (1948) (transaction called "lease" held conditional sale). For
further cases, see 2 UmsFo m LAws ANNc-TXTED, UNIFORZI CUxr1ITIO-.AL SALES ALr-
(1922), Cum ANN. Poc. Par § 1, Case Notes (1951). However, the fact that the
seller is not paid upon delivery does not necessarily mean he extended crecdit, as the term
is commercially used. The recording statutes are drafted for transactions in which the
parties contemplate and bargain for credit. But check payment, as such, is not a "credit"
device by which the seller decreases the buyer's burden of making payment, accepting in
return such benefits as interest or additional orders. The check, as distinguished from a
note, is primarily a mode of making a cash payment. See Hodgson v. Barrett, 33 Ohio
St. 63, 31 Am. Rep. 527 (1877).
55. Estoppel is the only rationale by which, under the Sales Act, a third party may
acquire rights from one who does not hold title. U=mo~t S.Es Act § 23. In bad check
cases, courts have sometimes based the estoppel defense on the seller's "misplaced confidence"
or "negligence," Crescent Chevrolet Co. v. Lewis, 230 Iowa 1074, 300 N.V. 20 (1941);Michigan R.R. v. Phillips, 60 Ill. 190 (1871). The majority of courts, however,
follow the rule: if "one of two innocent persons must suffer by the act of a third, he who
has enabled such third person to occasion the loss must sustain it" Lickbarro.v v. Mason,
2 Durn. & East 63, 70 (1787). Cf. Sullivan Co. v. Larson, 149 Neb. 97, 30 N.W.2d 4601
(1948) ; Seward v. Evrard, 240 Alo. App. 893, 222 S.W.2d 509 (1949). The "he who"
rule has been criticized as being applicable to both third party and seller with equal
justification. See Vold, Worthless Check Cash Sales, "Substantially Sin::dlancozs" a:d
Conflicting Analogies, 1 HASTINGS JOURNAL 111, 121 (1950).
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senting the check u6 or pursuing the goods, 7 or if he transfers both possession
of the goods and "indicia of ownership."'18 Almost any writing related to
the sale now satisfies the "indicia" requirement, whether or not the document
has any bearing on title to the transferred goods. 9 Certainly, the "indicia"
requirement is meaningless when the buyer is a merchant" 0 A merchant's
possession of the goods is sufficient to permit a bona fide third party to infer
that the merchant is entitled to resell.61 Moreover, since "indicia" are no
longer required for estoppel in other areas of sales law, 2 the requirement in
bad check cases is an exception to the modern rule. If the "indicia" require-
ment were dropped, estoppel would provide a simple device for protecting
all bona fide third parties.
56. E.g., Pohl v. Johnson, 179 Minn. 398, 229 N.W. 555 (1930) ; Oldridge v. Sutton,
157 Mo. App. 485, 137 S.W. 994 (1911).
57. E.g., People's State Bank v. Brown, 80 Kan. 520, 103 Pac. 102 (1909) ; Frech v.
Lewis, 218 Pa. 141, 67 Atl. 45 (1907). See also Vold, Cash Sales, 14 ST. Louis L. Rnv.
1, 7 nn.23, 24, 25 (1929).
58. See De Vries v. Sig Ellingson & Co., 100 F. Supp. 781 (D. Minn, 1951);
Clark v. Hamilton Diamond Co. 209 Cal. 1, 284 Pac. 915 (1930); Capital Automobile
Co. v. Ward, 54 Ga. App. 873, 189 S.E. 713 (1936) ; Gustafson v. Equitable Loan Ass'n,
186 Minn. 236, 243 N.W. 106 (1932). The reason generally given to support the "indicia"
requirement is that "[o]ne may possess a chattel as a borrower, a bailee, lessee or under
other varied circumstances.. ." J. L. McLure Motor Co. v. McLain, 34 Ala. App. 614, 616,
42 So. 2d 266, 268 (1949). Cf. Cowan v. Thompson, 25 Tenn. App. 130, 152 S.W.2d 1036
(1941) ; Young v. Harris-Cortner, 152 Tenn. 15, 268 S.W. 125 (1924). This argument,
however, is not convincing. While in a bailor-bailee transaction, the protection of the owner
may be desirable, he need not necessarily be protected in the seller-buyer relationship, where
his original intention was not to retain but to dispose of the goods.
Courts differ on the meaning of "indicia of ownership." It seems that generally some
kind of document is required. See note 59 infra. But the more liberal view considers
the term interchangeable with "circumstantial evidence." Blount v. Bainbridge, 79 Ga.
App. 99, 53 S.E.2d 122 (1949).
59. E.g., White v. Pike, 240 Iowa 596, 36 N.W.2d 761 (1949) (certificate of title);
Wolfe v. Smith, 80 Ga. App. 136, 55 S.E.2d 675 (1949) (bill of sale) ; Johnson-Brinkman
Comm. Co. v. Central Bank of Kansas City, 116 Mo. 558, 22 S.W. 813 (1893) (bill of
lading); Ammon v. Gamble-Robinson Comm. Co., 111 Minn. 452, 127 N.W. 448 (1910)
(warehouse receipts); Sullivan v. Larson, 149 Neb. 97, 30 N.W.2d 460 (1948) (truck
billing); Crescent Chevrolet Co. v. Lewis, 230 Iowa 1074, 300 N.W. 260 (1941) (invoice).
The requirement of documentary "indicia" is absurd when the document itself gives
notice of the check payment. Yet some courts have protected third parties because of
such documents. E.g., Crescent Chevrolet Co. v. Lewis, supra; Wolfe v. Smith, supra.
Cf. Hall v. LeCroy, 79 Ga. App. 676, 54 S.E.2d 468 (1949).
60. Some courts do not require "indicia" when the buyer is a merchant. Capital
Automobile v. Ward, 54 Ga. App. 873, 189 S.E. 713 (1936) ; Keegan v. Kaufman Bros.,
68 Cal. App. 2d 197, 156 P.2d 261 (1945). Cf. Boice v. Finance & Guaranty Corp., 127
Va. 563, 102 S.E. 591 (1920). See Note, 80 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 755 (1932).
61. See, e.g., UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 9 (buyer in the ordinary course
of business protected against the seller even if the contract was properly filed); UNI-
FORM TRuST RECEIPTS ACT § 9; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-403 (2) (Official Draft
1952) ; WILLISTON, SALES § 314. See also Notes, 80 U. oF PA. L. REv. 755 (1932) ; 2 RocicY
MT. L. REv. 261 (1930); 42 HA~v. L. REv. 573 (1929).
62. E.g. UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 5; UNIFORM TRusT RECEIPTS Acr §§
8,9.
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